歐元區是否會繼續存在？法國和德國領導人現在因為希臘的緣故提出了這個問題。如果政策制定者們20年前就明白他們今天明白的道理，那麽他們根本就不會推出歐元。眼下歐元區之所以還抱成一團，只是因為各方對解體帶來的後果感到恐懼。問題是，這一點是否足以維系歐元區的存在。我想答案是否定的。
迄今為止，旨在控制住這場危機的各種努力均告失敗。沒錯，歐元區領導人挫敗了希臘總理喬治•帕潘德里歐(George Papandreou)以民主方式確立合法性的破壞性想法。但金融壓力仍深深困擾著意大利和西班牙（見圖表）。由於實際利率為4.5%左右、經濟增速為1.5%（2000年至2007年這八年的平均增速），意大利基本財政盈餘（付息前）與國內生產總值(GDP)之比必須長時間保持在接近4%的水平上。但該國的債務比率實在太高了。因此，它必須大幅擴大基本財政盈餘、大幅提高經濟增速，或者大幅降低利率。但在意大利總理西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)的領導下，這些必要的調整舉措哪個都不可能出台。換一位領導人能夠改善這一局面嗎？我不知道。
魯比尼討論了同時解決這些存量和流量挑戰的四種選擇：第一，通過積極放鬆貨幣政策、歐元貶值以及核心國家出台刺激性政策來恢復增長和競爭力，同時外圍國家實行財政緊縮和改革；第二，單純在外圍國家進行通縮調整和結構性改革，以壓低名義工資；第三，由核心國家為某個不具競爭力的外圍國家提供永久性融資；第四，進行廣泛債務重組，歐元區部分解體。第一種選擇可實現調整，且不會引發大規模違約。第二種措施無法及時實現流量調整，因此很可能會演變成第四種選擇。第三種選擇會避免外圍國家的存量和流量調整，但有可能導致核心國家失去償債能力。第四種選擇顯然是歐元區的“末日”。
唉，這些選擇都面臨著巨大的障礙。第一種選擇最有可能見到經濟效果，但德國不可能接受它。第二種選擇是德國在政治上可以接受的（盡管會對該國經濟造成不利影響），但外圍國家無論如何不可能接受。第三種選擇是德國在政治上無法接受的，甚至外圍國家也很可能接受不了。第四種選擇是所有人都無法接受的——如果只是就目前而言的話。
當前的局面是第二種和第三種選擇的糟糕結合：外圍國家單邊實行緊縮，核心國家不太情願地提供融資。邁爾認為，局面可能會向第一種選擇演變。他的觀點是，歐洲央行體系(ESCB)為幫助無法在市場上融資的銀行而充當最後貸款人的行為，正從資金方面支撐著國際收支赤字。其結果是，盈餘國家央行在歐洲央行(ECB)的資產負債表上積累起巨額貸方頭寸，赤字國家央行則積累起與之相當的負債（見圖表）。這是一個轉移聯盟。邁爾指出，從長期看，國際收支赤字的貨幣性融資將產生通脹效應，於是演變成魯比尼提出的第一種選擇。我並不能肯定通脹危險切實存在。但德國人無疑害怕這一危險會變成現實。
長期來看，第一種和最後一種選擇似乎最有可能：要麽整個歐元區做出調整，要麽歐元區解體。德國應該坦然面對前一條道路帶來的風險。我知道，德國害怕的是1923年的惡性通脹重演。但1930-32年間的嚴厲緊縮卻最終把阿道夫•希特勒(Adolf Hitler)推上臺。
問題在於，解決方案是否可行，而不至於毀掉整個世界。首先要確定的是，對於嚴重缺乏競爭力的國家，比如希臘，解決方案應該是合作性的。希臘應推出一種貨幣——“新德拉克馬”。根據希臘法律簽訂的新合同以及希臘的稅收和支出應使用這種貨幣。現有合同仍使用歐元。銀行要保留遺留的歐元賬戶，同時開設新德拉克馬賬戶。新德拉克馬兌歐元匯率將由市場決定。它肯定會迅速貶值，但這是極為必要的。
希臘政府應恪守重新制定的外部方案的條款。它應該在很可能會出現的新貨幣大幅實際貶值的幫助下，繼續努力實現財政平衡。希臘央行應獨立管理新貨幣。以新貨幣計價的物價水平肯定會飆升，但由於產能處於過剩狀態，因此在一定的外部幫助下，惡性通脹是可以避免的。公共部門和私人部門歐元債務違約的規模將很可觀。但即使希臘不推出新貨幣，而是選擇以長期國內通縮的方式來重新獲得對外競爭力，上述歐元債務的實際價值也將飆升。推出新貨幣只是會加速整個過程。與此同時，希臘會失去在歐洲央行內的投票權。但重獲投票權的可能仍然存在。
這種重新推出新貨幣的合作性方案將是代價最小的方案。但它肯定會產生傳染效應。如果歐元區決心避免這種風險，那麽它就必須回到魯比尼提出的第一種選擇上。具備潛在償債能力的國家將獲得融資，歐元區將通過增長來逐步擺脫危機。
建立在單邊通縮調整之上的歐元區沒有前途。這似乎是確定無疑的。如果歐元區領導人堅持這一政策，他們就必須承擔由此造成的後果。
* 《解決歐元區國際收支存量和流量不平衡的四種選擇》(Four Options to Address the Eurozone’s Stock and Flow Imbalances)，未發表，網址：www.roubini.com/analysis/165338
譯者/何黎
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Thinking through the unthinkable
Will the eurozone survive? The leaders of France and Germany have now raised this question, for the case of Greece. If policymakers had understood two decades ago what they know now, they would never have launched the single currency. Only fear of the consequences of a break up is now keeping it together. The question is whether that will be enough. I suspect the answer is: no.
Efforts to bring the crisis under control have failed, so far. True, the eurozone’s leadership has disposed of George Papandreou’s disruptive desire for democratic legitimacy. But financial stress is entrenched in Italy and Spain (see chart). With a real interest rate of around 4.5 per cent and economic growth of 1.5 per cent (its average from 2000 to 2007, inclusive), Italy’s primary fiscal surplus (before interest rates) needs to be close to 4 per cent of gross domestic product, indefinitely. But the debt ratio is too high. So the primary surplus has to be far bigger, the growth rate far higher, or the interest rate lower. Under Silvio Berlusconi, none of the necessary changes are going to happen. Would another leader fix things? I wonder.
The fundamental difficulty throughout has been the failure to understand the nature of the crisis. Nouriel Roubini of New York University’s Stern School of Business makes the relevant points in a recent paper.* He distinguishes, as I did in a column on October 4, between the stocks and the flows. The latter matter more. It is essential to restore external competitiveness and economic growth. As Thomas Mayer of Deutsche Bank, notes, “below the surface of the euro area’s public debt and banking crisis lies a balance-of-payments crisis caused by a misalignment of internal real exchange rates.” The crisis will be over if and only if weaker countries regain competitiveness. At present, their structural external deficits are too large to be financed voluntarily.
Mr Roubini discusses four options for addressing these stock and flow challenges simultaneously: first, restoration of growth and competitiveness through aggressive monetary easing, a weaker euro and stimulatory policies in the core, while the periphery undertakes austerity and reform; second, a deflationary adjustment in the periphery alone, together with structural reforms, to force down nominal wages; third, permanent financing by the core of an uncompetitive periphery; and, fourth, widespread debt restructuring and partial break-up of the eurozone. The first could achieve adjustment, without much default. The second would fail to achieve flow adjustment in time and so is likely to morph into the fourth. The third would avoid both stock and flow adjustment in the periphery, but threaten insolvency in the core. The fourth would simply be the end.
Alas, huge obstacles exist to all of these options. The first is the most likely to work economically, but is unacceptable to Germany. The second is politically acceptable to Germany (despite the bad effects on its economy), but would ultimately be unacceptable in the periphery. The third is politically unacceptable to Germany and is even likely to prove unacceptable in the periphery, too. The fourth is unacceptable to everybody, if only for now.
What is now happening is an unhappy mixture of the second and third options: one-sided austerity with grudging finance. Mr Mayer argues that it could morph into the first. His argument is that the lender-of-last-resort activity of the European System of Central Banks, in favour of banks unable to fund themselves in the market, is financing payments deficits. Central banks of the surplus countries are, as a result, accumulating large credit positions vis a vis the European Central Bank, while those of the deficit countries are accumulating counterpart liabilities (see chart). This is a transfer union. In the long run, suggests Mr Mayer, monetary financing of balance of payments deficits is going to prove inflationary and so turn into the first of Mr Roubini’s options. I am not sure that the danger of inflation is real. But Germans certainly fear it is.
In the long run, the first and last of Mr Roubini’s options seem most likely: either the entire eurozone adjusts, or it breaks up. Germany should accept the risks of the former path. I know that its nightmare is the hyperinflation of 1923. Yet the brutal austerity of 1930-32 finally brought Adolf Hitler to power.
The question is whether exit would be feasible without blowing up the world. Start with a decision that, for a severely uncompetitive country, such as Greece, exit would be co-operative. Greece would introduce a currency – the “new drachma”. New contracts executed under Greek law and taxes and spending in Greece would be in this currency. Existing contracts would stay in euros. Banks would have legacy euro accounts and new drachma accounts. The exchange rate of the new currency against the euro would be set in the market. It would depreciate rapidly. But that is desperately needed.
The Greek government would abide by the terms of a reformulated external programme. It would continue to strive for fiscal balance, helped by what is likely to be a massive real depreciation. Its central bank would manage the new currency independently. The price level would jump in the new currency, but, given the excess capacity, hyperinflation could be avoided with some external support. Public and private default on euro liabilities would be sizeable. But if Greece were to experience prolonged domestic deflation, in order to regain external competitiveness, without the new currency, the real value of euro debt would also explode upwards. This would merely accelerate the process. Meanwhile, Greece would lose its vote in the ECB. But the possibility of a return would remain.
Such a co-operative approach to reintroduction of a new currency would be the least costly. But it would surely generate contagion. If the eurozone has decided that it must avoid that threat, then it must go back to the first on the menu of options laid out by Mr Roubini. Potentially solvent countries would be financed and the eurozone would grow its way out of the crisis.
A eurozone built on on one-sided deflationary adjustment will fail. That seems certain. If the leaders of the eurozone insist on that policy, they will have to accept the result.
* Four Options to Address the Eurozone’s stock and flow imbalances, unpublished, www.roubini.com/analysis/165338.
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