金融危机启蒙课

作者：英国《金融时报》首席经济评论员 马丁•沃尔夫

2010 年06月10日

“爸爸，危机结束了吗？”

“哦，博比，还没真正结束呢。看看那些有关市场动荡的新闻就知道了。”

“那为什么还没结束呢，爸爸？”

“这次危机是从2007年8月开始的，2008年秋季发展到了最糟糕的地步。以历史标准衡量，对于规模这么大的危机来说，这个时间不算太长。”

“爸爸，还不算太长？ 你不是说那些担保和注资，央行的印钞——你称之为‘非常规政策'——以及政府的借贷，已经化解了危机吗？”

“博比，你没注意听我说话，”父亲有点儿不耐烦地答道：“我当时说的是，这些行动将阻止危机演变成一场萧条。我说的总是对的。”

博比深情地笑了。

“别傻笑了，”他父亲说道：“就拿富裕的西方国家来说吧：去年它们的产出萎缩了3.3%——是第二次世界大战以来最糟糕的。你听说过二战，对不对？”

“噢，是的。我们在学校至少学到过三次。”

“那好，经济合作与发展组织(OECD)——我知道，这个名字够长的——本周表示，今年这些富裕国家的产出可能会增长2.7%。全球经济在2009年下降了0.9%之后，预计今年将增长4.6%。即使与半年年前相比，这也超出了几乎所有人的预期。”

“如果这是真的，”孩子答道：“那为什么所有人都在谈论‘不稳定性'呢？这说的是什么啊？”

“你知道地震之后会有一些余震。这么说吧，财政危机可能是金融危机之后的余震。然后它们可能又会引发金融余震。”

博比开始觉得这个话题有点意思了，这让他觉得惊讶。“爸爸，那么这一切是怎么回事呢？”

“唔，想想2007-09年的金融地震之前都发生过什么：地产价格大幅上涨，建筑业一片兴旺；私人债务出现爆炸式增长；金融复杂性明显上升。于是，当地产价格下跌的时候，我们感到非常恐慌。但还发生了另外两件事情：政府获得了超出预期的收入，并花掉了其中的大部分；同时，它们还能很轻松地借到钱。”

“在新出现的欧元区，所有成员国政府都发现自己能够借到钱，就好像它们是德国。家庭和企业也能够按照‘德国'条件借钱。所以，它们大把花钱。在光景好的时候，工资也大幅飙升。”

博比打了个哈欠。他爸爸接着说了下去。

“那么，危机之后发生了什么呢？在一些受泡沫影响的国家——美国、英国、爱尔兰和西班牙——财政赤字上升到了和平时期未曾见过的水平。于是出现了财政危机的威胁。”

“引发这场余震的，是有人爆出希腊在自身财政状况问题上撒谎的消息，而那之后，欧元区又未能做出回应：对于自己应该援救那些不负责任的挥霍者的观点，德国人愤愤不平；而其他人则认为德国人冥顽不化、欺凌弱小。如此这般，在回应金融问题方面，欧洲人就犯下了与美国人同样的错误：他们坐视危机在眼前发展。”

“但它们出手拯救了希腊啊，”博比说道：“那怎么会还有那么多动荡呢？”

“关键问题在于投资者并不全是傻子：他们知道这些只是暂时的救急措施；他们知道希腊债务问题将会恶化；他们知道其它欧洲外围国家将发现自己难以摆脱自身困境；他们也知道欧元区成员国之间的团结正摇摇欲坠；他们知道德国人很生气；他们还知道资金不足的银行容易遭受主权风险的冲击。所有这一切，让欧元看起来像是个糟糕的赌注。所以欧元贬值了。”

“这我懂，”博比回答，“但这些对欧元区有帮助吗？”

“是的，”他爸爸答道。“但这会影响其他地区的前景——比如美国和英国。然后人们又会担心这些国家也存在巨大的财政问题。目前市场似乎并不在意。但他们的观点有可能改变。更糟糕的是，他们不知道该担心什么：最终的结果会是通缩、违约、通胀、金融危机，还是统统都有？市场和小孩子一样，是无法预测的。”

博比决定不对这种取笑做出回应。“那么，”他若有所思地问道，“下面会发生什么事情呢？”

“如果我知道的话，就不会只是一个财经记者了，”他爸爸答道。

博比笑了——这话听起来耳熟。

他爸爸没有注意到。“没准儿，美国经济获得的动能，以及大型新兴市场——特别是中国——将引领世界走出危机。经合组织说了，认为经济前景‘适度乐观'”。

“或者，你可能会说，庞大的财政赤字是不可持续的，而在欧元区和英国，旨在控制赤字的努力，将引发新的衰退和政治纷争。同时，我们才刚刚开始削减私人债务，这需要许多年的时间。那些银行规模太大了，而且它们的资产负债表上有着太多的可疑资产。此外，新兴国家规模太小，实力也比较弱，不足以担当世界经济的火车头。还有些人担心中国目前经济过热，或正面临巨大的资产价格泡沫——不过我不这么认为。还有，目前在朝鲜和伊朗问题上，存在地缘政治方面的不确定性。简单地说，市场之所以动荡，就是因为所有这些不确定性的存在。”

博比开始觉得这些话又有些耳熟了：爸爸喜欢看悲观的一面。但就像妈妈总说的那样，他有可能是错的。

“不管怎么说，”爸爸总结道，“这些余震可能将持续多年，财政方面的担忧会影响金融行业的信心，并产生反作用力。它也会影响到你：未来几十年，西方国家政府将会缺钱。日子将会很悲惨。不过你可以学习中文，然后去东方发展。”

博比呻吟着。这听起来可是个苦差事。但他静静地上床睡去。是什么噩梦把他惊醒？

译者/怀川

---

AN ABC OF FINANCIAL SHOCKS AND FISCAL AFTERSHOCKS

“Is the crisis over, Daddy?”

“Not really, Bobby. Just look at the news of market turmoil.”

“Why isn't it over, Daddy?”

“The crisis began in August 2007 and reached its worst in autumn of 2008. By historical standards, that is not so long for such a big crisis.”

“Not so long, Daddy? Did you not say that the guarantees and capital injections, the money-printing by central banks – ‘unconventional policy', you called it – and the borrowing by governments had fixed the crisis?”

“Bobby, you don't pay enough attention,” replied his father, a bit impatiently. “What I said is that these actions would stop the crisis from becoming a depression. I was right, as usual.”

Bobby smiled, affectionately.

“Stop smirking,” said his father. “Take the rich western countries: their output shrank by 3.3 per cent last year – the worst performance since the second world war. You do know about the war, don't you?”

“Oh yes. We have studied it at least three times at school.”

“Well, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – I know, that's a mouthful – said this week that the output of the rich countries might grow by 2.7 per cent this year. The world economy is forecast to grow 4.6 per cent after a 0.9 per cent decline in 2009. This is better than almost anybody expected even half a year ago.”

“If that's true,” replied the boy, “why do all these people talk about ‘instability'? What's that about?”

“You know about aftershocks following earthquakes. Well, fiscal crises can be the aftershocks of financial crises. And then they can cause financial aftershocks, in their turn.”

Bobby was beginning to find this lecture interesting, to his surprise. “So how does that work, Daddy?”

“Well, think about what happened before the financial earthquake of 2007-09: there were huge rises in property prices and booms in construction; there was an explosion of private debt; and there was a big increase in financial complexity. So, when property prices fell, we had the big panic. But two other things happened: governments received more revenue than they had expected, most of which they spent; and they borrowed easily, too.

“In the new eurozone, all governments found they could borrow as if they were Germany's. Households and businesses could also borrow on German terms. So they bought and built. In the good times, wages also soared.”

Bobby yawned. His father drove on.

“So what happened after the crisis? Fiscal deficits exploded to levels never before seen in peacetime, particularly in countries affected by the bubbles – the US, UK, Ireland and Spain. So the threat of a fiscal crisis emerged.

“What triggered this aftershock was the revelation that Greece had lied about its fiscal position, followed by the inability of the eurozone to respond: Germans were outraged at the idea that they should rescue irresponsible profligates; others thought the Germans inflexible bullies. So the Europeans made the same mistake as the Americans had made when responding to financial worries: they let the crisis get ahead of them.”

“But they bailed out Greece,” said the boy. “So why all the turbulence?”

“The big point is that investors are not altogether stupid: they know these are temporary patches; they know Greek indebtedness is going to worsen; they know that other countries in peripheral Europe will find it hard to grow out of their plight; they know that solidarity among eurozone member countries is fraying; they know Germans are very angry; and they know that inadequately capitalised banks are vulnerable to sovereign risks. All this makes the euro seem a worse bet. So it has fallen in value.”

“I understand that,” replied Bobby. “But won't that help the eurozone?”

“Yes,” agreed his father. “But it will worsen prospects elsewhere – in the UK and US, for example. And then there's the worry that these countries have huge fiscal difficulties, too. The markets don't seem to mind now. But they might change their view. Worse, they don't know what to fear: will it end up in deflation, default, inflation, financial shocks, or all of these? Markets are unpredictable, like children.”

Bobby decided not to respond to this teasing. “So,” he asked thoughtfully, “what's going to happen next?”

“If I knew that, I wouldn't be a mere economic journalist,” his father said.

Bobby smiled: a familiar remark.

His father did not notice. “Maybe, the momentum gained by the US and the big emerging markets, especially China, will let the world ride through the shocks. The OECD calls the outlook ‘moderately encouraging'.

“Alternatively, you could argue that the massive fiscal deficits are unsustainable and that attempts to rein them in, in the eurozone and UK, are going to cause renewed recession and political strife. We have also barely begun reducing private debts, which will take years. The banks are far too big and have too many doubtful assets on their books. Meanwhile, emerging countries are too small and weak to be locomotives for the world. Some people worry that China is overheating or suffering from huge asset price bubbles, too, though I disagree. And then there is geopolitical uncertainty over North Korea and Iran. In short, markets are volatile because of all the uncertainty out there.”

Bobby was beginning to find this familiar: his father tended to see the gloomy side. But he could be wrong, as his mother enjoyed pointing out.

“Anyway,” concluded his father, “these aftershocks are likely to go on for years, with fiscal worries undermining confidence in the financial sector and back again. It will affect you, too: western governments are going to be short of money for decades. It's going to be miserable. But you can learn Chinese and go east.”

Bobby groaned. It sounded like hard work. But he went off quietly to bed. What nightmares disturbed him?

martin.wolf@ft.com

More columns at www.ft.com/martinwolf